with two corps of the enemy, and requested reinforcements. Anderson's division, which had just reached Cashtown, was at once pushed forward to his support, and General Lee with his staff quickly followed.

The situation in front at that time was as follows: During the forenoon of July 1st the two leading corps of the Federal army, commanded by General Reynolds, had arrived at Gettysburg; at the same time the heads of Hill's and Ewell's corps were rapidly approaching. About ten o'clock, General Heth of Hill's corps encountered a part of Buford's cavalry, which had been thrown forward on the Chambersburg road to a small stream called Willoughby Run, three miles from Gettysburg. Having driven back Buford, Heth engaged Wadsworth's division of the First corps, which was soon reinforced by other divisions of that corps, while Heth was supported by Pender's division of Hill's corps. The advance of the Eleventh corps (Howard's) and the arrival of Rodes's and Early's divisions of Ewell's corps, increased the proportions of the combat, which quickly became animated and continued with spirit until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Federal corps were totally defeated and driven from the field with very heavy loss. General Reynolds was killed, and his two corps were seriously reduced in numbers and greatly disorganized. The Confederate loss was much smaller than that of the enemy; nevertheless, the fall of many gallant soldiers was to be regretted. Among the wounded was the gallant General Heth, whose command suffered severely.

Near the close of the action General Lee reached the field. Anderson's division came up soon afterward, and about the same time Longstreet arrived in advance of his corps, which was a few miles behind. As the troops were evidently very much fatigued, and somewhat disorganized by rapid marching and hard fighting, it seemed inadvisable to immediately pursue the advantage which had been gained, particularly as the retreating forces of the enemy were known to have been reinforced, and to have taken a defensive position about a mile south of the town.

This subject occupied Lee's attention upon perceiving the



situation of affairs and the victory gained by his advance forces, and he entered into a conversation with Longstreet, in the presence of the writer, concerning the relative positions of the two armies and the movements it was advisable to make. Longstreet gave it as his opinion that the best plan would be to turn Meade's left flank and force him back to the neighborhood of Pipeclay Creek. To this General Lee objected, and pronounced it impracticable under the circumstances.

At the conclusion of the conversation Colonel Long was directed to make a reconnoissance of the Federal position on Cemetery Ridge, to which strong line the retreating troops had retired. This he did, and found that the ridge was occupied in considerable force. On this fact being reported to General Lee, he decided to make no farther advance that evening, but to wait till morning before attempting to follow up his advantage. This decision the worn-out condition of his men and the strength of the position held by the enemy rendered advisable. He turned to Longstreet and Hill, who were present, and said, "Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable." In the conversation that succeeded he directed them to make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action the next day. Longstreet's corps was at that time near Cashtown, but bivouacked for the night on Willoughby's Creek, about four miles from the battlefield.

I will here add that Gettysburg affords a good example of the difficulties to be encountered and the uncertainty of being able to harmonize the various elements of armies when the field of operations is extensive. This battle was precipitated by the absence of information which could only be obtained by an active cavalry force. General Lee had previously considered the possibility of engaging the enemy in the vicinity of Gettysburg, but the time and position were to have been of his own selection. This could have been easily effected had not the cavalry been severed from its proper place with the army.

At a later hour in the evening than that of the events above mentioned the writer had a further conversation with General Lee, which is of sufficient interest to be here narrated. We

were then together at the bivouac, under the trees of an apple orchard.

The general, as if he had been thinking over his plans and orders, turned to me with the remark, "Colonel Long, do you think we had better attack without the cavalry? If we do so, we will not, if successful, be able to reap the fruits of victory."

"In my opinion," I replied, "it would be best not to wait for Stuart. It is uncertain where he is or when he will arrive. At present only two or three corps of the enemy's army are up, and it seems best to attack them before they can be greatly strengthened by reinforcements. The cavalry had better be left to take care of itself."

General Lee evidently agreed with me in this opinion. Much as he had been annoyed and his movements hampered by Stuart's absence, the condition of affairs was such that but one judicious course was open. An attack in force on the enemy before he could concentrate his army was very promising of success, and it was with this purpose fully determined upon in the general's mind that the events of that day ended for the Confederate army.

At this stage of the campaign the Count of Paris alludes to the tactics and strategy of General Lee in a tone of criticism which calls for some rejoinder on our part. He remarks:

"He has four alternatives to select from: He has the choice to retire into the gaps of the South Mountain, in order to compel Meade to come after him; or to wait steadily in his present positions for the attack of the Federals; or, again, to manœuvre in order to dislodge them from those they occupy by menacing their communications by the right or left; or, finally, to storm these positions in front, in the hope of carrying them by main force. The best plan would undoubtedly have been the first, because, by preserving the strategic offensive, Lee would thus secure all the advantages of the tactical defensive."

Could the count have seen the actual field of operation and have known the circumstances that governed General Lee, he would probably have taken a different view of his actions.

It must be borne in mind that in entering Pennsylvania without his cavalry General Lee was unable to accumulate supplies.

In fact, the subsistence of his army mainly depended on the provisions that could be collected in the vicinity of his line of march by detachments of infantry mounted on artillery- and wagon-horses. Therefore, if Lee had adopted the count's preferred plan of operation and occupied one of the passes of South Mountain, he would have placed his army in a trap that would have, in the absence of a miracle, resulted in its destruction; for Meade with his superior forces could have enclosed him without supplies or the means of obtaining them. Lee would thus have been reduced to the alternative of laying down his arms or of cutting his way out with great sacrifice of life and the loss of his artillery and transportation.

The above objection is also applicable to the count's second plan, with the addition that General Lee's line was too much extended to admit of a successful defence against General Meade's superior force. In answer to the count's third plan, it is only necessary to say that the proximity of the two armies and the absence of cavalry on the part of the Confederates rendered manœuvring impracticable. The fourth is the only one that admitted of the hope of success, and was the one adopted by General Lee.

That the battle may be more clearly described it is necessary to present some of the principal topographical features of the neighborhood of Gettysburg. The town of Gettysburg, nestling in a small valley, is surrounded by numerous low ridges making various angles with each other. The most important of them is the one situated about a mile south-west, known as Cemetery Ridge. It is terminated by two conical mounds about four miles apart. The one to the south is designated the Round Top. The one to the north is called Culp's Hill.

Immediately after the defeat of the First and Eleventh corps Cemetery Ridge was selected as the Federal position. Nearer the town is a second ridge, nearly parallel to, and about a thousand yards west of, the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge during the battle formed the Confederate centre. From its southern extremity springs obliquely a spur extending almost on a line with the Round Top. This naturally formed the Confederate right. East of the town the valley is traversed by a small

stream, beyond which rises abruptly a commanding ridge which was occupied by the Confederate left. The more distant view is bounded by South Mountain and its projecting spurs.

As we have said so much in regard to the absence of the cavalry and the difficulties thence arising, it is proper at this point to explain its cause. Stuart's passage of the Potomac at a point eastward of that where the Federal crossing was made was intended, as has been said, as a feint, with the view of creating a diversion in favor of General Lee by arousing fears of danger to Washington, to the vicinity of which city the cavalry advanced. However, the movement proved a highly unfortunate one, and was followed by irretrievable disaster; for Stuart had no sooner entered Maryland than his return was barred by the intrusion of a large Federal force between him and the river, and he was thus obliged to make a wide circuit through Maryland and Pennsylvania before he could resume his proper place with the army. This occupied him seven or eight days, and it was the 2d of July before he rejoined the army at Gettysburg in a very reduced condition, for many of his men had been dismounted, and the horses of those who remained in the saddle were much jaded by long and rapid marches. Notwithstanding the bad plight of his cavalry, Stuart, with his usual promptitude, placed it on the flanks of the army, where its presence was much needed. On the 3d it engaged the enemy's cavalry in frequent skirmishes and several fierce encounters, in one of which General Hampton was severely wounded.

The divisions of Robertson and Jones, which had been ordered up from the passes of the Blue Ridge, did not reach the army in time to take part in the battles of the 1st and 2d, and were too late to be of any service in preliminary reconnoissances. In consequence of these facts, General Lee in the whole of this campaign was deprived of the use of that portion of his force which has been truly named "the eye of the army," since without it all movements are made in the dark and the army is forced to grope its way forward.

At an early hour on the morning of the 2d the writer (Colonel Long) was directed to examine and verify the position of

the Confederate artillery. He accordingly examined the whole line from right to left, and gave the necessary instructions for its effective service. As the morning advanced surprise began to be felt at the delay in commencing the attack on the right, which had been ordered to take place at an early hour. The object was to dislodge the Federal force, that had retreated after its defeat to the position known as Cemetery Ridge, before it could be reinforced to any considerable extent. By so doing Lee hoped to be able to defeat the Federal army in detail before it could be concentrated. Ewell was directed to take a position opposite the eastern termination of Cemetery Ridge, while Hill occupied the ridge parallel to it; and Longstreet, whose corps had bivouacked four miles in the rear, was to move early the next morning and assail the Federal left, while Ewell was to favor his attack by an assault upon the Federal right. Hill was to hold himself in readiness to throw his strength where it would have the greatest effect.

After completing the duties assigned him, Colonel Long returned to join General Lee, whom he met at Ewell's headquarters about 9 A. M. As it appeared, the general had been waiting there for some time, expecting at every moment to hear of the opening of the attack on the right, and by no means satisfied with the delay. After giving General Ewell instructions as to his part in the coming engagement, he proceeded to reconnoitre Cemetery Ridge in person. He at once saw the importance of an immediate commencement of the assault, as it was evident that the enemy was gradually strengthening his position by fresh arrivals of troops, and that the advantage in numbers and readiness which the Confederate army possessed was rapidly disappearing.

Lee's impatience increased after this reconnoissance, and he proceeded in search of Longstreet, remarking, in a tone of uneasiness, "What *can* detain Longstreet? He ought to be in position now." This was about 10 A. M.

After going some distance he received a message that Longstreet was advancing. This appeared to relieve his anxiety, and he proceeded to the point where he expected the arrival of the corps. Here he waited for some time, during which

interval he observed that the enemy had occupied the Peach Orchard, which formed a portion of the ground that was to have been occupied by Longstreet. This was that advance movement of Sickles's command which has given rise to so much controversy among Federal historians.

General Lee, on perceiving this, again expressed his impatience in words and renewed his search for Longstreet. It was now about 1 o'clock P. M. After going some distance to the rear, he discovered Hood's division at a halt, while McLaws was yet at some distance on the Fairfield road, having taken a wrong direction. Longstreet was present, and with General Lee exerted himself to correct the error, but before the corps could be brought into its designated position it was four o'clock. The hope that had been entertained of taking the enemy at a disadvantage and defeating him in detail no longer existed. The whole of the Federal force, except Sedgwick's corps, was strongly posted on Cemetery Ridge. Sedgwick, whose corps had made a march of thirty-five miles in twenty hours, had reached the field, though his men were too much exhausted by the length and rapidity of their march to be of immediate service. Yet the opportunity which the early morning had presented was lost. The entire Army of the Potomac was before us!

General Longstreet has published an explanation of the causes of this unfortunate, if not fatal, delay in the arrival of his troops, yet it cannot be said that the reason which he gives is entirely satisfactory. He says that on the 1st of July the march of his corps had been greatly delayed by the occupation of the road by a division of the Second corps and its wagon-trains. Yet his whole force, except Law's brigade, had reached a position within four miles of Gettysburg by midnight. On the next day, "Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations the movement began. Engineers sent out by the commanding general and myself guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route.

McLaws's division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left."

This explanation, as we have said, is not satisfactory. Longstreet, as he admits, had received instructions from Lee to move *with that portion of his command which was up*, to gain the Emmettsburg road. These orders he took the responsibility of postponing on account of the absence of one brigade of his command, so that, instead of being in readiness to attack in the early morning, it was four o'clock in the afternoon when his troops reached the field.

He now found the position which had been laid out for him occupied by Sickles's corps of the Federal army, which had pushed forward considerably in advance of the line of Cemetery Ridge and taken position on the lower ridge along which ran the Emmettsburg road. Cemetery Ridge at this portion of its extent is ill defined, and the movement of Sickles to occupy the advanced position was not without tactical warrant. Yet it was faulty, from the fact that his line, to gain a defensive position for its left flank, had to be bent at a considerable angle at the advanced point known as the "Peach Orchard." General Humphreys's division occupied the road, while Birney's division held the salient point at the Peach Orchard, and was stretched back through low ground of woods and wheatfields toward Round Top, near which the left flank rested in a rocky ravine.

The weak point in this line was the salient at the Peach Orchard, which formed the key of Sickles's position; and on this, when the columns of Longstreet's corps moved to the attack at 4.30 P. M., the greatest vigor of the assault felt. The first assault, however, was made by Hood's division, which attacked the left wing of Sickles's corps, extending from the Peach Orchard to the vicinity of the two elevations known as Round Top and Little Round Top.

Through an interval which lay between Sickles's left and the foot of Round Top, Hood's extreme right thrust itself unperceived by the Federals, and made a dash for Little Round Top,

which, through some strange oversight, was at this moment quite unoccupied by any portion of Meade's army. The elevation known by this name is a bold spur of the loftier height called Round Top. It is very rough and rugged, covered with massive boulders, and rendered difficult of ascent by its steepness and its outcropping granite ledges. Yet it was the key-point of that whole section of the battlefield, and had Hood dreamed of its being unoccupied, pushed a powerful force in that direction, and seized the commanding summit, the victory would have been in his grasp, since the possession of this point would not only have placed Sickles's corps in a highly perilous position, but have enabled him to take the entire line in reverse.

It was at this critical moment that the Federals discovered their error and hastened to amend it. The prompt energy of a single officer, General Warren, chief engineer of the army, rescued Meade's army from imminent peril. He had reached Little Round Top at the point of time in which Hood's men penetrated the undefended space between Sickles's left and Round Top, and just as the signal-officers who occupied the summit were folding up their flags preparatory to leaving the dangerous situation. Directing them to continue waving their flags, Warren hastened away in search of some available force to hold the hill, and, meeting a division of Sykes's corps which was marching to the support of Sickles's command, he detached from it Vincent's brigade, which he hurried to the threatened summit. A battery also, with great difficulty, was dragged and lifted to the top of the rugged hill.

It was a desperate rush from both sides for the possession of the important point, and the Federal brigade reached the crest just as the gallant Texans of Hood's division were swarming up the rocky slope with shouts of triumph. There ensued a desperate struggle for the contested summit. A severe volley from the Federals met Hood's men full in the face as they climbed the steep acclivity. The fight quickly became a hand-to-hand conflict, in which levelled bayonet and clubbed musket did their share in the work of death. For half an hour the contest continued. But the advantage of the Federals in their

possession of the summit was not to be overcome, and, though the brave Texans stubbornly held the rocky glen at the foot of the hill, and worked their way up the ravine between the two elevations, they were eventually forced back by the Federals, though not without causing heavy loss to the latter. The error which had been made by the Federals was immediately retrieved by the reinforcement of Vincent's brigade, while Round Top was occupied at a later hour in the evening.

While this desperate struggle was in progress the assault on Sickles's corps was vigorously pressed by McLaws's division, particularly at the salient in the Peach Orchard, which was evidently the weak point of the line. The Federal resistance was stubborn, and reinforcements were hurried up to the imperilled point; yet the Confederate onslaught proved irresistible, pushing the line back to a wheatfield in the rear of the Peach Orchard, and eventually breaking it and hurling the enemy in disordered flight toward the high grounds in the rear.

This success rendered the Federal position untenable. The flanks of the broken line were exposed right and left, and, though reinforcements were in rapid succession hurried to the front, the whole line was gradually forced back toward Cemetery Ridge, leaving the hotly-contested field strewn with thousands of dead and wounded. Thus, after a severe conflict for several hours, Longstreet had gained the position which he could have occupied earlier in the day without opposition. His advantage had not been gained without heavy loss, and, though the Confederates had gained the base of Cemetery Ridge, its crest was crowned with troops and artillery too strongly placed to be driven out by Longstreet's men in their exhausted condition.

A desperate effort to carry the ridge was made, but it proved unsuccessful, and the battle on that part of the line ended without a decisive result. It had been contested with great determination, and the loss on both sides had been heavy, but the Confederate success had consisted in driving the Federals out of an intrinsically weak position, while the strong defensive line of Cemetery Ridge remained intact in their hands. Whether the result would have been different had the original

assault been made on this line is a question which it is impossible now to answer, and the advantage or disadvantage of Sickles's advance movement cannot be determined except from the standpoint of military strategy.

During Longstreet's assault on the right Hill's corps had made strong demonstrations against the Federal centre, but Ewell's demonstration on the left, which was ordered to be made at the same time, was delayed, and the corps only got fairly to work about sunset. The assault was maintained with great spirit by the divisions of Early and Edward Johnson until after dark. Early carried Cemetery Ridge, but was forced to relinquish it by superior numbers. The left of Ewell's corps penetrated the breastworks on the extreme right of the Federal line, and this position was held during the night. The ill-success of Early's movement was due to lack of support, the columns on his right failing to reach the contested point until after he had been forced to relinquish the position he had gained on the crest and retire to his original ground.

In the words of Colonel Taylor, "The whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of the several commands, and no decisive results attended the operations of the second day." This discordance was one of the unfortunate contingencies to which every battle is subject, and is in no sense chargeable to General Lee, whose plan had been skilfully laid, and had it been carried out in strict accordance with his instructions would probably have led to a very different result. On both sides the disregard by corps commanders of the express intentions of their superiors had changed the conditions of the battle. Sickles's advance beyond the position designed to be held by General Meade had exposed his corps to repulse and heavy loss, which possibly might have been avoided had he held the line of Cemetery Ridge, while Longstreet's assumption of the responsibility of delaying the assault ordered certainly had a most important influence on the result of the battle.

The dawn of the 3d of July found the two armies in the position in which the battle of the preceding day had ended. Though Cemetery Ridge remained intact in the hands of the

Federals, yet the engagement had resulted at every point in an advantage to the Confederates. Longstreet had cleared his front of the enemy, and occupied the ground from which they had been driven. Ewell's left held the breastworks on Culp's Hill on the extreme right of the Federal line. Meade's army was known to have sustained heavy losses. There was, in consequence, good reason to believe that a renewed assault might prove successful. Ewell's position of advantage, if held, would enable him to take the Federal line in reverse, while an advance in force from Longstreet's position offered excellent promise of success. General Lee therefore determined to renew the assault.

Longstreet, in accordance with this decision, was reinforced, and ordered to assail the heights in his front on the morning of the 3d, while Ewell was directed to make a simultaneous assault on the enemy's right. Longstreet's dispositions, however, were not completed as early as those of Ewell, and the battle opened on the left before the columns on the right were ready to move. Johnson, whose men held the captured breastworks, had been considerably reinforced during the night, and was on the point of resuming the attack when the Federals opened on him at four o'clock with a heavy fire of artillery which had been placed in position under cover of the darkness. An infantry assault in force followed, and, though Ewell's men held their ground with their usual stubbornness, and maintained their position for four hours, they were finally forced to yield the captured breastworks and retire before the superior force of the enemy.

This change in the condition of affairs rendered necessary a reconsideration of the military problem, and induced General Lee, after making a reconnoissance of the enemy's position, to change his plan of assault. Cemetery Ridge, from Round Top to Culp's Hill, was at every point strongly occupied by Federal infantry and artillery, and was evidently a very formidable position. There was, however, a weak point upon which an attack could be made with a reasonable prospect of success. This was where the ridge, sloping westward, formed the depression through which the Emmettsburg road passes. Perceiv-

ing that by forcing the Federal lines at that point and turning toward Cemetery Hill the right would be taken in flank and the remainder would be neutralized, as its fire would be as destructive to friend as foe, and considering that the losses of the Federal army in the two preceding days must weaken its cohesion and consequently diminish its power of resistance, General Lee determined to attack at that point, and the execution of it was assigned to Longstreet, while instructions were given to Hill and Ewell to support him, and a hundred and forty-five guns were massed to cover the advance of the attacking column.

The decision here indicated was reached at a conference held during the morning on the field in front of and within cannon-range of Round Top, there being present Generals Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and H. Heth, Colonel A. L. Long, and Major C. S. Venable. The plan of attack was discussed, and it was decided that General Pickett should lead the assaulting column, to be supported by the divisions of McLaws and Hood and such other force as A. P. Hill could spare from his command. The only objection offered was by General Longstreet, who remarked that the guns on Round Top might be brought to bear on his right. This objection was answered by Colonel Long, who said that the guns on Round Top could be suppressed by our batteries. This point being settled, the attack was ordered, and General Longstreet was directed to carry it out.

Pickett's division was fresh, having taken no part in the previous day's fight, and to these veterans was given the post of honor in the coming affray, which promised to be a desperate and terrible one.

About twelve o'clock the preparations for the attack were completed and the signal for battle was given, which was immediately followed by the concentrated fire of all the Confederate artillery on Cemetery Hill, which was promptly responded to by the powerful Federal batteries. Then ensued one of the most tremendous artillery engagements ever witnessed on an open field: the hills shook and quivered beneath the thunder of two hundred and twenty-five guns as if they were

about to be torn and rent by some powerful convulsion. In the words of General Hancock in reference to the performance of the opposing batteries, "Their artillery fire was the most terrific cannonade I ever witnessed, and the most prolonged— . . . . one possibly hardly ever paralleled."

For more than an hour this fierce artillery conflict continued, when the Federal guns began to slacken their fire under the heavy blows of the Confederate batteries, and ere long sank into silence—an example which was quickly followed by the Confederates.

A deathlike stillness then reigned over the field, and each army remained in breathless expectation of something yet to come still more dreadful. In a few moments the attacking column, consisting of Pickett's division, supported on the left by that of Heth commanded by Pettigrew, and on the right by Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division, appeared from behind a ridge, and, sweeping over its crest, descended into the depression that separated the two armies. The enemy for a moment seemed lost in admiration of this gallant array as it advanced with the steadiness and precision of a review. Their batteries then opened upon it a spasmodic fire, as if recovering from a stunning blow. The force that moved to the attack numbered about 15,000 men. It had a terrible duty to perform. The distance which it was obliged to traverse was more than half a mile in width, and this an open plain in full front of the enemy, who thickly crowded the crest of the ridge, and within easy range of their artillery.

But the tempest of fire which burst upon the devoted column quickly reduced its strength. The troops of Heth's division, decimated by the storm of deadly hail which tore through their ranks, faltered and fell back in disorder before the withering volleys of the Federal musketry. This compelled Pender's division, which had marched out to support the movement, to fall back, while Wilcox, on perceiving that the attack had grown hopeless, failed to advance, leaving Pickett's men to continue the charge alone. The other supports, Hood's and McLaws's divisions, which had been expected to advance in support of the charging column, did not move, and were too remote

to offer any assistance. The consequence was that Pickett was left entirely unsupported.

Yet the gallant Virginians marched steadily forward, through the storm of shot and shell that burst upon their devoted ranks, with a gallantry that has never been surpassed. As they approached the ridge their lines were torn by incessant volleys of musketry as by a deadly hail. Yet with unfaltering courage the brave fellows broke into the double-quick, and with an irresistible charge burst into the Federal lines and drove everything before them toward the crest of Cemetery Hill, leaping the breastworks and planting their standards on the captured guns with shouts of victory.

The success which General Lee had hoped and expected was gained, but it was a dearly-bought and short-lived one. His plan had gone astray through the failure of the supporting columns. Now was the time that they should have come to the aid of their victorious comrades; but, alas! Heth's division, which had behaved with the greatest gallantry two days before, had not been able to face the terrible fire of the Federal lines, while the other supports were too remote to afford timely relief. The victory which seemed within the grasp of the Confederate army was lost as soon as won. On every side the enemy closed in on Pickett's brigades, concentrating on them the fire of every gun in that part of their lines. It was impossible to long withstand this terrific fusillade. The band of heroes broke and fell back, leaving the greater part of their number dead or wounded upon the field or captive in the hands of their foes.

The Confederates lost in this attack about 4000 men, the most of whom were in Pickett's division. No troops could have behaved better than those of the Army of Northern Virginia on witnessing Pickett's repulse. The officers of every grade on that part of the field exerted themselves with the utmost coolness in preserving order and in endeavoring to re-form the broken ranks, and the men so promptly obeyed the call to rally that their thin ranks were soon restored to order and the whole line was again established. The army was not discouraged or dispirited, and its sole wish was for an opportunity

to efface the mortification of its first serious repulse. The desire was general that Meade should assume the offensive and in his turn make an attack, and no doubt was felt of the ability to give him a yet hotter reception than that which Pickett had received. But Meade found his army so much shattered and discouraged by his recent losses that he deemed it inadvisable to attempt to follow up his success.

In this connection Colonel Biddle of General Meade's staff says: "It had been General Meade's intention to order a general advance from our left after the close of the action, but owing to the lateness of the hour and the wearied condition of the army, with a 'wisdom that did guide his valor to act in safety,' he abandoned the movement he had contemplated. For this he has been severely censured. General Howard, in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, says: 'I have thought that the fearful exposure of General Meade's headquarters, where so much havoc was occasioned by the enemy's artillery, had so impressed him that he did not at first realize the victory he had won.' The reverse of this is true. General Meade was not in the least 'demoralized' by the enemy's fire, but realized fully the exact condition of affairs. Lee had been repulsed, not routed, and if Meade had yielded to his own inclination to attack he would have been repulsed himself, and would thus have thrown away the fruits of his great victory."

That this view is correct is proved by the following passage from Mr. William Swinton's *History of the Army of the Potomac*. Mr. Swinton says: "I have become convinced from the testimony of General Longstreet himself that attack would have resulted disastrously. 'I had,' said that officer to the writer, 'Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I had a heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt that I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received.'"

Mr. Swinton further informs us that besides the heavy loss it had sustained by Pickett's attack, the Army of the Potomac was thrown into much confusion by the intermingling of the troops of different divisions and corps. Among the wounded

were Major-generals Hancock and Gibbon, two of its most prominent officers. The same writer also informs us that the aggregate loss of the Army of the Potomac during the three days' battle was 23,000 men. Among the officers killed was Major-general J. F. Reynolds, whose gentlemanly bearing and soldierly qualities were unsurpassed in any other officer of either army. In view of this heavy loss, while admitting that General Lee was defeated, it must be acknowledged that General Meade was so much crippled that he could not reap any advantage of victory.

The attack of Pickett's division on the 3d has been more criticised, and is still less understood, than any other act of the Gettysburg drama. General Longstreet did not enter into the spirit of it, and consequently did not support it with his wonted vigor. It has been characterized as rash and objectless, on the order of the "charge of the Light Brigade." Nevertheless, it was not ordered without mature consideration and on grounds that presented fair prospects of success. By extending his left wing west of the Emmettsburg road, Meade weakened his position by presenting a weak centre, which being penetrated, his wings would be isolated and paralyzed, so far as regarded supporting each other. A glance at a correct sketch of the Federal position on the 3d will sufficiently corroborate this remark, and had Pickett's division been promptly supported when it burst through Meade's centre, a more positive proof would have been given, for his right wing would have been overwhelmed before the left could have disengaged itself from woods and mountains and come to its relief.

Pickett's charge has been made the subject of so much discussion, and General Lee's intentions in ordering it have been so misunderstood, that it is deemed proper to here offer, in corroboration of what has been said above, the testimony of one who was thoroughly conversant with all the facts. Colonel Walter H. Taylor, adjutant-general on the staff of General Lee, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, vol. iv. p. 83, states as follows: "Later, General Lee rode over to General Ewell's front and conferred as to future movements. He wanted to follow up the success gained—thought that with Johnson's

division, then up, that General Ewell could go forward at dawn next day. Ewell, Early, and Rodes thought it best to await Longstreet's arrival and make the main attack on the enemy's left. This was determined on. Longstreet was then about four miles off, with two of his divisions. He was expected early on the morning of the 2d. Orders were sent him to move up to gain the Emmettsburg road. He did not reach the field early, and his dispositions were not completed for attack until four o'clock in the afternoon. In his report General Longstreet says he received orders to move with the portion of his command that was then up, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left, but, fearing that he was too weak to attack, he delayed until one of his brigades (Law's) joined its division, and that he began the movement as soon after its arrival as his preparations would admit. It seemed impossible to get the co-operation of the commanders along the line. When Longstreet did attack, he did it in handsome style—drove the enemy and captured prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. So far, we had succeeded in every encounter with the enemy. It was thought that a continuance of the attack as made by Longstreet offered promise of success. He was ordered to renew the fight early on the 3d; Ewell, who was to co-operate, ordered Johnson to attack at an early hour, anticipating that Longstreet would do the same. Longstreet delayed. He found that a force of the enemy occupying high ground on their left would take his troops in reverse as they advanced. Longstreet was then visited by General Lee, and they conferred as to the mode of attack. It was determined to adhere to the plan proposed, and to strengthen him for the movement he was to be reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's of Hill's corps. With his three divisions which were to attack Longstreet made his dispositions, and General Lee went to the centre to observe movements. The attack was not made as designed: Pickett's division, Heth's division, and two brigades of Pender's division advanced. Hood and McLaws were not moved forward. There were nine divisions in the army; seven were quiet, while two assailed the fortified line of the enemy. A. P. Hill had orders to be prepared to assist Long-

street further if necessary. Anderson, who commanded one of Hill's divisions and was in readiness to respond to Longstreet's call, made his dispositions to advance, but General Longstreet told him it was of no use—the attack had failed. Had Hood and McLaws followed or supported Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson been advanced, the design of the commanding general would have been carried out: the world would not be so at a loss to understand what was designed by throwing forward, unsupported, against the enemy's stronghold so small a portion of our army. Had General Lee known what was to happen, doubtless he would have manœuvred to force General Meade away from his strong position by threatening his communications with the East, as suggested by ——; but he felt strong enough to carry the enemy's lines, and I believe success would have crowned his plan had it been faithfully carried out."

The author can add his testimony to that of Colonel Taylor. The original intention of General Lee was that Pickett's attack should be supported by the divisions of McLaws and Hood,* and General Longstreet was so ordered. This order was given verbally by General Lee in the presence of Colonel Long and Major Venable of his staff and other officers of the army.

It is to be regretted that we have no report from the gallant General Pickett in regard to this celebrated charge. It has, however, recently been developed that Pickett did make a very full report, which he forwarded to General Lee. The report severely criticised the failure to furnish him with the supporting force which had been ordered; and Lee, with his usual magnanimity, and in his great desire for harmony between the officers of his army, returned the report to Pickett, requesting him to withdraw it and to substitute in its stead a report embracing merely the casualties of his command; to which Pickett assented and destroyed his first report.

The following is a copy of General Lee's letter to General Pickett in which he made this request:

* "As they were ordered by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders when arranging the fight, and called his attention to it long afterward, when there was discussion about it. He said, 'I know it! I know it!' C. S. VENABLE."

"GENERAL C. E. PICKETT, *commanding General:*

"You and your men have crowned yourselves with glory, but we have the enemy to fight, and must carefully, at this critical moment, guard against dissensions which the reflections in your report will create. I will therefore suggest that you destroy both copy and original, substituting one confined to casualties merely.

"I hope all will yet be well.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

"R. E. LEE,
"*General.*"

But one course remained open for General Lee. Retreat was necessary. After the failure of the attack he had withdrawn Ewell to Seminary Ridge, a position north-west of the town, covering the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, which he caused to be rapidly and strongly fortified in anticipation of the assault which this contraction of his line might invite. He had still an army of 50,000 men, unbroken in spirit and quite ready to sustain any attack which might be made upon them. But it was quickly evident that Meade had no intention of making an aggressive movement, and a renewed assault on the part of the Confederates would have been madness. Moreover, the ammunition of the army had been nearly exhausted in the three days' fight, and, in Lee's own words, "the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were." There was danger of the line of communications being cut by the enemy. General Meade had sent a force to reoccupy Harper's Ferry, and a body of Federal cavalry had reached the Potomac near Falling Waters and destroyed the pontoon bridge laid there for the passage of the Confederate army.

Under these circumstances General Lee determined upon a retreat, but not such an immediate or hasty one as would present the appearance of flight. That he had deeply felt the failure of his effort is unquestionable, yet he preserved much of his ordinary calmness of demeanor, and not one word came from his lips to show that he laid blame on any subordinate

officer. An incident is told which shows in a clear light his noble spirit.

The repulse of Pickett's column, and the terrible loss it had sustained, were a severe blow to that gallant officer. Overcome by the disaster to his men, he rode up to General Lee, and, almost sobbing, declared that his division had been nearly destroyed. Lee listened with his face full of sympathy, and replied with his usual kindness and consideration, "Never mind, general; all this has been *my* fault. It is *I* who have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can."

In illustration of his feeling concerning this battle we may here quote from a private letter to a lady relative which has been kindly placed at our disposal. After remarking, "I cannot tell how often and much I have thought of you the past winter, how I have grieved over your restraint and ill-usage by our enemies, and how I have regretted my inability to relieve you," he continues:

"I knew that crossing the Potomac would draw them off, and if we could only have been strong enough we should have detained them. But God willed otherwise, and I fear we shall soon have them all back. The army did all it could. I fear I required of it impossibilities. But it responded to the call nobly and cheerfully, and, though it did not win a victory, it conquered a success. We must now prepare for heavier blows and harder work. But my trust is in Him who favors the weak and relieves the oppressed, and my hourly prayer is that He will 'fight for us once again.'"

During the interval between the repulse of Pickett's charge and the night of July 4th no aggressive movement was made by General Meade, and the Army of Northern Virginia was left undisturbed by the enemy. General Lee employed this repose in preparation for his retreat. He caused the dead to be buried and the severely wounded to be carefully provided for, while those whose wounds permitted their removal were placed in ambulances and wagons and moved out on the Chambersburg road. In the afternoon the ambulance- and empty supply-trains, under the escort of Imboden's cavalry, were put in motion on

the Chambersburg road, and after passing South Mountain were moved on the direct road to Williamsport.

When it became dark the withdrawal of the army began. First the trains, under protection of Hill's corps, moved out on the Fairfield road; Longstreet followed Hill; then came Ewell, bringing up the rear. The movement was so much impeded by soft roads, darkness, and rains that the rear-guard could not be withdrawn until daylight on the morning of the 5th. General Meade did not attempt to harass the retreating columns of Lee until the rear-guard had reached the neighborhood of Fairfield; then a pursuing column appeared on the neighboring heights, which Early promptly prepared to meet by throwing the rear-guard across its path. After exchanging a few shots the enemy retired, and the retreat was continued without any other molestation than an attack on the ambulance-train by a detachment of the enemy's cavalry and the capture of a few ambulances and wagons loaded with wounded. This mishap was attributable more to the roving character and want of discipline of the escort than to the daring of the enemy.

Without further interruption the trains reached Williamsport on the 6th, where their progress was arrested by a swollen river. Being menaced soon after their arrival by a large body of the enemy's cavalry, 1500 teamsters promptly volunteered, and, being armed with muskets brought from Gettysburg, gallantly defended their trains until reinforced by General Fitz Lee, when the combined force of teamsters and cavalry signally repulsed the enemy. About the same time Stuart encountered Pleasonton near Hagerstown, and after a fierce conflict Pleasonton was obliged to retire behind the Antietam.

The army bivouacked on the night of the 5th in South Mountain Pass, and on the morning of the 6th entered the rich and beautiful Cumberland Valley. The sky had cleared, and the bright sun and beautiful landscape filled the hearts of the stern veterans with pleasure as they passed with measured tread over the smooth and easy-graded roads.

Reaching Williamsport on the 7th, and finding his pontoon bridge destroyed and the Potomac swollen far above the fording-point, General Lee occupied a strong position, covering

Williamsport and Falling Waters, the point where he had left his bridge on advancing into Pennsylvania. As day after day passed without the appearance of the enemy, General Lee was able to complete his defences, so that when Meade arrived in force on the 12th the Army of Northern Virginia was eager to encounter its old antagonist, though double its numerical strength.

"The retreat of Lee, which became definitely known to the Federal commander on the morning of Sunday, July 5th, brought with it the important question of pursuit. Now, there were two lines by which the Confederates might be followed up: the one was a direct pursuit by the same routes over which they had retreated, pressing them down the Cumberland Valley; the other, a flank march by the east side of the South Mountains, defiling by the Boonsboro' passes, with the view to head off the enemy or take him in flank. The former had the advantage of being the shorter line—the distance to the Potomac at Williamsport being in this case about forty miles, and by the latter line nearly eighty. The only disadvantage attending it arose from the fact that the enemy might hold the débouches of the mountains with a rear-guard while making good his escape with his main body and trains. General Meade appears to have been in some doubt as to the proper method of action, but on the morning of the 6th he sent a column in direct pursuit. He ordered Sedgwick's Sixth corps, then the freshest in the army, to follow up the enemy on the Fairfield road, while he despatched a cavalry force to press the retreating Confederates on the Chambersburg road. Sedgwick that evening overtook the rear of the Confederate column, after a pursuit of ten miles, where the Fairfield road breaks through a pass in the South Mountain range. This position was found to be very defensible, but there was no attack, as another course had meanwhile been determined on, and Sedgwick was recalled. Instead of pursuing the Confederates by the direct route over which the retreat had been made, Meade judged it better to make a flank march by Middletown and the lower passes of the South Mountain. To this end, General French, who with 7000 men had since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry

been occupying Frederick, was directed to seize these passes in advance and repossess himself of Harper's Ferry. Both of these orders were executed by General French, who also sent out a cavalry force that penetrated as far as Williamsport and destroyed there a pontoon bridge across the Potomac. Then the army was put in motion by the east side of the South Mountains. On July 6th a large part of the army moved from Gettysburg toward Emmettsburg, and the remainder on the following day.

"On July 7th the Federal headquarters were at Frederick. On the 8th they were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of that place and South Mountain. On the 9th the headquarters were at South Mountain House, and the advance of the army at Boonsboro' and Rohrersville. On the 10th they were moved to Antietam Creek, while the left of the line crossed the creek and the right moved up near Funkstown. On the 11th the engineers threw a new bridge over the Antietam Creek, when the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones's Cross-roads, while the right remained nearly stationary. On the 12th, Meade had his forces in front of the position taken up by Lee to cover the passage of the Potomac.

"The above data will suffice to show that the pursuit was conducted with an excessive circumspection, and that Lee, having reached the river six days before, had time to select and fortify a strong position. Indeed, the Confederate army might have effected an unmolested escape into Virginia had it not been for the fact that the great rains had so swollen the Potomac as to make it impassable by the ford at Williamsport, and that the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters had been destroyed by General French. This perilous circumstance compelled Lee to take up a defensive position where he might stand at bay while his communications were being re-established." *

From the fact that Lee was not pursued, and that no effort was made to crush him before he could extricate himself from his perilous situation at Williamsport, it would be just to conclude that the Army of the Potomac was too much crippled to do so, and that Meade's success was mainly due to the want of

* Swinton's *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 366–368.

prompt co-operation by a portion of the forces of his antagonist, otherwise, as an able general, he would have vigorously followed up his advantage in order to gather the fruits of his victory.

Notwithstanding the Army of the Potomac after its departure from Gettysburg was reinforced to its former numerical strength, General Meade did not attack, but employed the 12th and 13th in fortifying his position. On the other hand, General Lee, now that his bridge was finished and that the river had fallen so as to be fordable for cavalry and empty and lightly-loaded wagons, being unwilling to engage in a battle that could not promise important results, withdrew from his position on the night of the 13th, and retired across the Potomac. The movement was completed during the forenoon of the 14th without interruption, and the broad Potomac rolled between the hostile armies. The only incident that indicated that the retreat had been discovered was the charge of a squadron of Federal cavalry on the rear-guard as it was about to follow the army across the river, the result of which was a slight loss to the Confederates, including the gallant General Pettigrew of North Carolina, who was rapidly rising to distinction. General Lee continued to retire slowly toward Winchester, and shortly after Meade moved down the river to the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry, and late in July entered Virginia east of the Blue Ridge, whereupon Lee withdrew from the Valley and took a position behind the Rapidan about the 1st of August, while General Meade occupied the neighborhood of Culpeper Court-house.

The losses of the army in killed, wounded, and prisoners were heavy, reaching nearly 16,000 men: many of these, however, being slightly wounded, returned to the ranks in time to participate in the ensuing campaign. Amongst the killed were Generals Armistead, Garnett, and Barksdale, gallant soldiers, much beloved by the army; among the wounded were Generals Hood, Heth, and Kemper, and Pender mortally.

The Army of Northern Virginia was distinguished for valor in battle, for discipline and patient endurance on the toilsome marches and in comfortless bivouacs: although depressed by defeat, it did not lose its courage for a moment, nor was its confidence shaken in its great commander.

Having placed the army in position on the Rapidan, and fearing the failure of his campaign in Pennsylvania might have caused the Confederate authorities to lose confidence in him, and feeling unwilling by retaining command of the army to embarrass them in their future plan of operations, General Lee sent his resignation to the President; which was, however, returned by Mr. Davis with every assurance of confidence.

Colonel Venable has related to the author an anecdote of considerable interest as showing the estimable character of General Lee. The incident occurred during the retreat from Gettysburg.

One day in July, 1863, after the battle of Gettysburg, when the Army of Northern Virginia lay on the north bank of the Potomac between Williamsport and Falling Waters, General Lee spoke pretty hotly to Lieutenant-colonel Venable of his staff for making a report of an unsatisfactory condition of things at the Williamsport ford or ferry in too loud a tone of voice. Venable retired to his tent in no pleasant mood. Very soon, however, the general sent him an invitation to come and drink a glass of buttermilk with him. He of course accepted the invitation, but his angry feelings at what he esteemed an unmerited rebuke were only partially soothed by partaking of the friendly glass of the mild but sour beverage with his honored chieftain. On the next night the army recrossed the Potomac. About 3 A. M., after getting through the work of supervision of the crossing of the army-trains at one of the Williamsport fords, which had been assigned to Lieutenant-colonel Baldwin and himself, Venable rode down, in a drizzling rain, to the vicinity of the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Having made his report, he threw himself on the ground near by, and soon fell asleep. When he awoke he found General Lee had taken the oil-cloth poncho from his own shoulders and thrown it over him. The hot-tempered aide-de-camp was thoroughly conquered.

We cannot better end this somewhat extended chapter than by presenting the following incident, for whose authenticity we can give no higher authority than the columns of a newspaper, yet which is so consonant with all that the writer knows

of the character of General Lee that no better voucher for its complete truth could be offered. It is a story told by an old "Grand Army" man who has been viewing the panorama of the battle of Gettysburg, and says:

"I was at the battle of Gettysburg myself, and an incident occurred there which largely changed my views of the Southern people. I had been a most bitter anti-South man, and fought and cursed the Confederates desperately. I could see nothing good in any of them. The last day of the fight I was badly wounded. A ball shattered my left leg. I lay on the ground not far from Cemetery Ridge, and as General Lee ordered his retreat he and his officers rode near me. As they came along I recognized him, and, though faint from exposure and loss of blood, I raised up my hands, looked Lee in the face, and shouted as loud as I could, 'Hurrah for the Union!' The general heard me, looked, stopped his horse, dismounted, and came toward me. I confess that I at first thought he meant to kill me. But as he came up he looked down at me with such a sad expression upon his face that all fear left me, and I wondered what he was about. He extended his hand to me, and grasping mine firmly and looking right into my eyes, said, 'My son, I hope you will soon be well.'

"If I live a thousand years I shall never forget the expression on General Lee's face. There he was, defeated, retiring from a field that had cost him and his cause almost their last hope, and yet he stopped to say words like those to a wounded soldier of the opposition who had taunted him as he passed by! As soon as the general had left me I cried myself to sleep there upon the bloody ground."

CHAPTER XVI.

A CAMPAIGN OF STRATEGY.

Inactivity.—Promotions.—Reduction of Both Armies.—Lee's Forward Movement.—Meade Retires.—Cavalry Engagement.—Lee at Culpeper.—Meade's Movements.—Stuart's Dilemma.—Lee and the Scout.—Escape of the Cavalry.—Engagement at Bristoe.—Meade Safe from Pursuit.—Lee Retires.—"The Buckland Races."—Federal Successes.—The Armies Return to their Old Positions.—Meade's Scheme to Surprise Lee.—Concentration of the Confederates.—Intrenching at Mine Run.—The Federals Surprised.—Meade's Movements.—He Withdraws.—Lee Pursues.—In Winter Quarters.—Cavalry Raid.—Long Saves the Artillery.—Kilpatrick Repulsed.—Death of Dahlgren.—A Barbarous Order.—Federal Disclaimer.—Letter to Richmond City Council.

FOR several weeks both armies remained inactive in the positions they had assumed—Lee on the Rapidan, and Meade in the vicinity of Culpeper Court-house. During that time so many convalescents and other absentees were restored to the ranks that the Army of Northern Virginia, with a small accession from other sources, was raised to a strength of nearly 60,000 men. Since the reorganization of the artillery in May that arm had been greatly increased in efficiency; and as the scope for promotion had been extended, many artillery officers who had been previously confined to the lower grades had now before them a prospect of advancement. About the last of September, Colonel Long of General Lee's staff was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and assigned to the command of the artillery of the Second corps. Colonel E. P. Alexander of the artillery of the First, and Colonel Lindsay Walker, chief of that of the Third corps, were a little later promoted to a similar rank to Colonel Long, and a number of other promotions were made in the lower grades. The repose of two months had greatly improved the condition of the Confederate army.

Within the same period two corps had been detached from

the Federal army, and about the same time Longstreet with two divisions was withdrawn from the Army of Northern Virginia to reinforce General Bragg in Tennessee, and the third division (Pickett's) was sent to the district south of Petersburg to arrest raiding-parties of the enemy and collect supplies for the army. This reduction brought the opposing forces more nearly to a numerical equality than had previously been the case, and the change of conditions in his favor induced Lee to make an effort to force Meade to an engagement while his army was reduced in numbers.

There ensued a singular and interesting campaign, in which manœuvring in great measure took the place of fighting, each of the commanding generals endeavoring to take the other at a disadvantage, and each signally failing through the alertness and skill of his opponent. It was a game of wits instead of bullets, and for two months the armies were marched back and forth over the war-trodden soil of Virginia, ending very much where they began, the advantages of the game being about equal on both sides.

In pursuance of his plan of operations, on the 9th of October Lee crossed the Rapidan, and advanced to the neighborhood of Madison Court-house, leaving Fitz Lee with his division of cavalry and a small detachment of infantry to guard the fords of that stream, while Stuart with Hampton's division covered the army from the intrusion of the Federal cavalry, which was at that time picketing Robinson's River. On the 10th, Stuart encountered Kilpatrick's cavalry in the neighborhood of James City, and after a sharp conflict Kilpatrick withdrew, but still hovered in the vicinity of Stuart during the remainder of that day and part of the next, without, however, inviting another collision. From Madison Court-house Lee directed his course eastward, taking a circuitous route in order to screen his movements from observation by means of the forest and intervening mountain-spurs. Being much retarded by difficult roads, he did not reach his objective point near Culpeper Court-house until the afternoon of the 11th, too late to assail the Federal position that day.

Meanwhile, Meade had become aware of the movement of

the Confederate army. His first intimation of this had come from the cavalry engagement between Kilpatrick and Stuart. It becoming clear that Lee's infantry was moving in the rear of the cavalry, and that the Federal right was already turned, Meade quietly withdrew his army from its position at Culpeper, and retired during the night along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad toward the Rappahannock. Pleasonton's cavalry was left to cover the retreat.

Stuart, whom Fitz Lee had joined on the previous evening, pushed forward with his usual energy, and on reaching Culpeper Court-house came upon the enemy's rear-guard, consisting of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, which occupied the ridges east of the village. As Stuart approached they fell back toward Brandy Station. Stuart pursued with Hampton's division, and a little beyond the station closed on Kilpatrick and forced him to an engagement. On hearing the sound of battle, Fitz Lee came rapidly to the support of Stuart, but at the moment he was about to attack Kilpatrick in flank he discovered Buford on his own flank in order of battle. Affairs had now assumed a most singular attitude, Kilpatrick being between Stuart and Fitz Lee, while Fitz Lee was between Kilpatrick and Buford. Fitz Lee dexterously extricated himself from this perilous situation, while Kilpatrick availed himself of the opportunity to join Buford. Stuart and Pleasonton, being now again face to face with nearly equal force, renewed the conflict on the same ground which had been the scene of an indefinite conclusion several months before—one of the most brilliant cavalry engagements of the war, in which both sides claimed the victory. The advantage of the present affair remained with the Southern cavalry, their opponents retiring before them toward the Rappahannock. That night the Federal army crossed the river and blew up the railroad bridge in their rear.

Thus ended the first move in the game. On the approach of Lee his alert opponent had hastily retired, yet with such skill that nothing of value was left behind. Lee's purpose of bringing the enemy to battle south of the Rappahannock had been foiled by this rapid retreat. It became necessary, if the

flanking movement was to be continued, to cross the river and endeavor to reach the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in time to intercept the retreat of the foe. Unluckily, the rapidity of movement which this required was hindered by a lack of provisions. The army was obliged to remain at Culpeper Courthouse nearly all day of the 11th in order to collect supplies.

During this halt an incident occurred which shows an interesting phase of General Lee's character, and which we give in the words of General Hunt:

"Lee, while encamped at Culpeper, was of course cordially received by the people of the town. One of these, a lady who had been somewhat scandalized by the friendly relations between some of her neighbors and the Yankees, took occasion to complain to the general that certain young ladies, then present, had been in the habit of visiting General Sedgwick at his headquarters, which was pitched in the ample grounds of a citizen whose house he had declined to use.

"The young ladies were troubled, for the general looked very grave. But they were soon relieved when he said, 'I know General Sedgwick very well. It is just like him to be so kindly and considerate, and to have his band there to entertain them.—So, young ladies, if the music is good, go and hear it as often as you can, and enjoy yourselves. You will find that General Sedgwick will have none but agreeable gentlemen about him.'"

Early on the morning of the 12th, Lee became aware of the Federal movement. The army was at once put in motion in the direction of Warrenton Springs. The advance and retreat now presented much the character of a race. There is reason to believe that Meade was as willing to accept battle as Lee was to offer it, but neither general had any desire to fight at a disadvantage, and a brisk series of manœuvres for the advantage of position began.

Directing Stuart to follow and retard as much as possible the retreating column of the enemy, Lee advanced by a route nearly parallel with that on which Meade was retreating, with the hope of intercepting him at some point north of the Rappahannock.

Meanwhile, Meade had made a false move in the game which threatened to place him in a dangerous position. On the morning of the 12th he became aware of Lee's halt at Culpeper during the previous day. Conceiving the idea that his own haste had been premature, and that the intended movement of the Confederate general had been completed, he ordered a countermarch of the main body of the army to the south of the Rappahannock, retaining only the Third corps and General Gregg's cavalry division on the north of the stream.

The situation was now a singular one. While Lee was marching rapidly northward to seize Meade's communications, the latter was marching southward to meet Lee at Culpeper. It was an error that might have proved disastrous to the Federal army had not its commander become speedily aware of his mistake.

Gregg's division of cavalry, which had been advanced to watch the passage of the upper Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs, found itself assailed on the afternoon of the 12th by the van-guard of Lee's army, which was crossing the stream at that point. Gregg was severely handled by the Confederate column, and hastened back to apprise Meade of the movement he had discovered.

There was no longer any doubt as to Lee's intention. A courier was at once sent back in all haste to the three Federal corps south of the river to apprise them that the whole Confederate army was in full march upon Warrenton. Reaching them about midnight at their bivouac on the road to Culpeper, the messenger delivered his order, and very soon afterward the camp was broken up and the whole force in a rapid retrograde march toward the stream which they had so recently crossed. On the morning of the 13th the Federal army was again concentrated on the north of the Rappahannock.

Lee, unaware of the division of the Federal army and of the smallness of the force that was opposed to him north of the river, lost the important advantage which might have come from an attack on this single corps had he been advised of its isolated position. He continued his march upon Warrenton, in which location he was beyond the head of Meade's column, and if he

could have continued the pursuit on a converging line, he would have reached Bristoe Station in advance of Meade, and could have forced him to a general engagement. But as the army had progressed more rapidly than the supply-trains and the haversacks of the men were empty, it was necessary to halt in order to replenish them.

In the mean time, Stuart was expected to retard the retreat of the enemy as much as possible, and keep General Lee fully informed of his movements. While thus employed he observed a large wagon-train, and, hoping to secure a valuable prize, he pushed forward two brigades for that purpose. It may be remarked that an attack upon the train might have been the most effective way of accomplishing his purpose of retarding the Federal retreat, as Meade would have probably come to the rescue of so important an element in his army. But on approaching the train Stuart found it too strongly guarded to admit a possibility of its capture; he therefore abandoned the enterprise and prepared to regain his former position, when to his chagrin he found himself intercepted by two large bodies of Federal infantry, who were marching north by parallel roads on both sides of his position. His only chance of escape was to conceal his force from observation, which he did with remarkable coolness and address behind a wooded ridge that flanked the enemy's line of retreat. Here he was compelled, by the proximity of the enemy, to remain twelve hours. The position was a perilous one, as the coming of daylight would expose his little force to capture or annihilation. He sent a staff officer, Major A. R. Venable, to ride in the darkness between the two marching columns of the enemy until he could pass around the head of that one between him and the Confederate forces, and report his danger and the movements of the enemy to the commanding general. As this was a long road, he also sent one of his favorite scouts, Goode, to make his way on foot directly through the enemy's columns to General Lee and give him his exact position, with the request that a heavy fire of artillery be opened on the Federal columns at a point near the village of Auburn on their line of retreat, and thus facilitate the escape of his force, which he proposed to effect by simul-

taneously opening fire on them with his own guns, and then making a dash through with a combined charge of cavalry and artillery. Meantime, General Lee, who had camped near Warrenton for the night, hearing nothing from Stuart as to the position and movements of the enemy, became uneasy, and remained awake until a very late hour of the night in order to make preparations and give the necessary orders for the early movement of his army. Goode made his way safely through the Federal columns, and arrived at headquarters about one o'clock in the morning.

For the description of this event above given we are indebted to Colonel Venable, and particularly for the following characteristic anecdote of General Lee, which adds another to the many evidences of his innate nobility of soul:

General Lee, after listening by the camp-fire to Goode's account of Stuart's situation, retired to his tent. The scout, however, being very anxious in regard to General Stuart's danger, began, after the general retired, to explain more fully with the map to an aide-de-camp the relative positions of Stuart's and the enemy's forces, and the exact point where the fire of our artillery would be most effective in promoting his safe retreat from his perilous environment.

General Lee could hear from his tent something of this conversation, but caught from it only that Goode was talking of matters which scouts, as a rule, were permitted to tell only to the commanding general himself. So, coming to the door of his tent, he called out with stern voice that he did not wish his scouts to talk in camp. He spoke very angrily, and stepped back into his tent. Goode fairly trembled. The aide-de-camp, however, went forward to the general's tent and told him that the scout, who was devoted to Stuart and naturally very anxious for his safety, was only endeavoring to mark accurately on the map the point at which the diversion of the artillery fire was to be made, and was by no means talking from the mere desire to talk. General Lee came out at once from his tent, commanded his orderly to have supper with hot coffee put on the table for Goode, made him sit in his own camp-chair at the table, stood at the fire near by, and performed all the duties of

a hospitable host to the fine fellow. Few generals ever made such thorough amends to a private soldier for an injustice done him in anger.

Immediately afterward, Lee ordered Ewell to the relief of the imperilled cavalry. In the mean time, Lomax with his brigade of cavalry was endeavoring to create a diversion in Stuart's favor. On approaching Auburn, Ewell's advance-guard encountered the enemy's rear-guard and engaged it in a sharp skirmish, which terminated without important results. From his position Stuart heard all night the continuous tramp of the enemy. About daylight a detachment halted opposite his place of concealment to take some refreshments. While the unsuspecting Federals were thus employed Stuart suddenly opened upon them with his artillery, knocking over their coffee-pots and other utensils, as he says in his report, while his sharpshooters poured a rapid fire into the surprised troops. They were as quickly as possible moved to the opposite side of the hill, under cover from this destructive fire. Taking advantage of the confusion he had created, the "rollicksome *sabreur*" wheeled to the left and emerged safely toward Warrenton. He was greeted with cheers by the army, and the whole force was in the best of spirits at their narrow escape from capture or destruction.

Yet the delay thus occasioned was favorable to Meade, who continued his rapid movement toward Manassas. In General Lee's report of these operations no mention is made of this mishap of Stuart, which had such an injurious effect upon them. It is therefore to be inferred that he considered it an excusable accident of war.

On the release of Stuart from his perilous position Ewell and Hill resumed the pursuit. Meade had made the best use of the several unavoidable delays of the Confederate army, and though Hill, who was seeking to intercept the Federal retreat at Bristoe Station, made all haste in his march, he arrived there only in time to meet the rear-guard of Meade's army. He made a prompt attack on the Federal column, which was hastening to pass Broad Run, which the remainder of the army had already crossed. The assault proved unfortunate. General

Warren, who led the Federal rear-guard, quickly posted his men behind the railroad embankment at that point, from which impromptu breastwork he poured a destructive fire upon Hill's advancing troops. General Cooke, who led the charging brigade, was severely wounded, and his command repulsed with the loss of a number of prisoners and five pieces of artillery.

General Warren, having achieved this success, did not wait for a further assault, but hastened across Broad Run and hurried forward to join the main body. By the next morning the Federal army had crossed Bull Run, behind which they were erecting fortifications, their line extending toward the Little River turnpike.

When General Lee reached the position of Hill's repulse, that officer, mortified by his mishap, endeavored to explain the causes of his failure. The general listened in silence, and as they rode over the field strewn with dead bodies replied with sad gravity, "Well, well, general, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it."

The movement had evidently proved a failure. Meade was safe from any further pursuit, with the intrenchments around Washington and Alexandria to fall back upon in the event of a repulse or to retire to if he wished to avoid a battle. Lee felt it expedient to withdraw, and after destroying the railroad from Cub Run to the Rappahannock, he retired on the 18th to the line of that river, leaving the cavalry in the enemy's front.

Stuart did not retreat without giving the enemy a characteristic reminder of his presence. Leaving Fitz Lee near Manassas on the Federal front, he made a rapid détour with Hampton's division, and attacked the Second corps of Meade's army with his men dismounted and acting as sharpshooters. This assault produced some alarm at first, from the natural surmise that the attacking force might be the van-guard of Lee's army. On the advance of the Federal infantry, however, Stuart quickly drew back, and rode off in the direction of Warrenton.

He was followed by a body of Federal cavalry under General Kilpatrick, who came up with him near the village of Buck-

land on the Warrenton road. Here Stuart, at Fitz Lee's suggestion, executed a shrewd manœuvre. He retired, with Hampton's division, before the Federal cavalry, leaving Fitz Lee on the enemy's left flank. Kilpatrick pushed forward ardently after his retreating adversary, when suddenly the boom of Fitz Lee's artillery gave the prearranged signal. At sound of the guns Stuart wheeled and charged fiercely upon his pursuers. Fitz Lee at the same moment fell upon their flank. This unexpected double attack threw the enemy into confusion, and they retreated with headlong haste, pursued by Stuart at full speed "from within three miles of Warrenton to Buckland." The flight and pursuit was afterward known among the troopers by the humorous title of "the Buckland Races."

Lee remained on the Rappahannock until the railroad track was broken up and the rails removed for a distance extending from Catlett's Station to Culpeper Court-house. Meanwhile, the Federal army had again advanced, rapidly repairing the railroad as they moved forward, and on November 7th reached the Rappahannock. Lee's army was now encamped at Culpeper, with advanced forces near the river. A crossing was quickly effected at Kelly's Ford, and the troops which occupied the rifle-pits at that point were driven off with considerable loss in prisoners. An attack was made at the same time on a Confederate force which was injudiciously posted on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station. Here some old Federal intrenchments were occupied by a brigade of Early's division. They were assailed in force by a part of Sedgwick's corps, the works carried, and nearly the whole brigade, with a battery of artillery, captured by the Federals.

The way being thus cleared, Meade threw his whole army across the river and advanced on Culpeper, Lee retiring to his former position on the Rapidan. All the advantages of the campaign had been gained by Meade, and General Lee's well-designed movement had been defeated by untoward circumstances and by the alertness of the enemy. The summer campaign having been one of unusual activity, and the late operations having entailed severe hardships, it was thought advisable to go into winter quarters, particularly as a sharp

prelude had already announced the approach of winter and the proper season for active operations seemed to be at an end.

Yet Meade was not of this opinion. He was destined, ere the winter had fully set in, to make a movement which would prove as unsuccessful for him as the one just described had been for his antagonist, and end the year's campaigning with the final advantage in Lee's favor. As a prelude to this movement we may briefly describe the position of Lee's army, upon which the effort of his antagonist was based.

Ewell's corps occupied a position extending from the base of Clark's Mountain to Mine Run, a small tributary of the Rapidan, and covered Mitchell's, Morton's, Raccoon, and Summerville's fords; A. P. Hill's corps extended from Orange Court-house to Liberty Mills; and Stuart, as usual, protected the front and flanks of the army. Longstreet, as we have seen, had been detached on distant service; and, as numerous furloughs had been granted since the return of the army to the Rapidan, Lee's forces were far below any previous minimum.

Taking this circumstance into consideration, and having failed to satisfy the expectations of the Washington authorities, Meade determined to strike a blow that might accomplish some desirable result. Therefore, about the last of November he advanced his entire force to Germanna Ford, hoping to cross the Rapidan at that point and surprise Lee in his extended winter quarters. The movement seemed hopeful of success could Lee be caught unawares. Meade began his march upon the Rapidan on November 26th, making every effort to ensure secrecy and rapidity. Yet his advance had but fairly begun when the watchful Stuart discovered the movement, and hastened to report it to the Southern commander, who at once instituted measures for the rapid concentration of his army. An order was despatched to A. P. Hill to march to Vediersville, and there form a junction with Ewell, who was directed to retire from the Rapidan and take position behind Mine Run, a small stream which was excellently defended by Nature.

Ewell, who was at hand, concentrated his forces quickly, while Hill, who had from fifteen to twenty miles to march, was

but a few hours later in taking his position. The night of the 26th, during which these hasty movements were taking place, was a severely cold one. Yet General Lee, in his plain uniform and without other protection from the weather, was early in the saddle, and had reached Vediersville, where Stuart was bivouacked, before sunrise. Here, beside an open-air fire, covered only with an army blanket, the cavalry leader lay stretched in slumber. Lee is said to have remarked admiringly, as Stuart rose and advanced to meet him, "What a hardy soldier!" After a short consultation Stuart rode to the front, where he formed his command in face of the advancing foe, and with artillery and dismounted sharpshooters made every effort to obstruct their advance.

Meanwhile, Meade's army was advancing in the lightest marching order. All the trains had been left behind and the men supplied with ten days' rations, that nothing might impede their progress. Yet there were unforeseen causes of delay. The Third corps was three hours late in reaching the Rapidan, detaining the whole army for that time, since Meade was not willing to risk a crossing with less than his whole force. In laying the pontoon bridges they proved too short, causing another delay. Other obstacles arose, so that by the time the river was crossed twenty-four hours had elapsed.

This delay gave Lee all the time he needed. The rugged banks of Mine Run were densely clothed with timber, which the troops as they reached the ground hastily attacked with axes, and dragged the heavy logs to the points to be defended. The breastworks rose as if by magic. Lee rode along the banks of the stream, and with his great engineering skill selected the points to be defended and gave the necessary orders. In a remarkably short space of time an extended line of works was erected, composed of double walls of logs filled in with earth and with a strong abatis in front. The position had suddenly become formidable.

The Federal army had in the mean time been still further delayed. French's corps, marching too far to the right, had fallen in with Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. A sharp brush was the result, and by the time it could extricate itself

and open communications with the remainder of the army night had fallen.

It was not until the morning of the 28th that the army made its final advance to Mine Run, where, when Meade arrived hoping to gain an easy victory, he was confronted by a strong line of breastworks garnished with 150 pieces of artillery and backed by 30,000 veterans. The sight surprised him. The remarkable rapidity with which the defences on Mine Run were constructed must be attributed to the natural intelligence of the men, aided by their previous experience in throwing up earthworks around Richmond and Fredericksburg under the eye of General Lee, who, it must be remembered, had long been distinguished as a military engineer.

It was a bitter disappointment to General Meade to find that his well-laid plans had been utterly foiled by the skill and alertness of his antagonist. The next two days were spent in reconnoitering movements, in hope of finding a favorable point of attack. On the 29th, Warren reported favorable conditions for assault on the Confederate right, while Sedgwick discovered what seemed a weak point on its left. Orders for an assault at both points on the next morning were accordingly given, and at the appointed time the artillery of the right and centre opened briskly on the Confederate lines.

But not a sound came from Warren on the left. A new conclusion had been reached in that quarter—a verdict of the men themselves, communicated in a manner of startling significance to their commander. As the hour for the assault arrived it was found that each man had pinned to his blue blouse a scrap of paper with his name written thereon, that he might be recognized by his friends in case of death. This significant indication of the verdict of men whom long experience had made as expert military critics as their officers, was not to be disregarded. Warren, and after him Meade, made a new reconnoissance of the works before them, and the designed assault was pronounced hopeless. Meade declared that the position could not be carried without the loss of 30,000 men. This contingency was too terrible to be entertained. Yet the rations of the men were nearly exhausted, and nothing remained but